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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HUSKY OIL COMPANY OF DELAWARE, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
14466 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Both parties agree that the only issue is whether the exemption for "isolated and 
occasional sales" under Utah Sales and Use Tax Acts (Utah Code Annotated, §59-15-2(e) 
[1953, Repl. Vol. 1974] applies to sale by a person which is not made in pursuit of the 
regular course of his business of selling tangible personal property. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
The following important points appear in the Commission's brief: 
1. The State Tax Commission admits that its own longstanding regulations 
(until recent amendment) applied the isolated and occasional sale exemption 
to both wholesalers and retailers to any sale not made in the regular course of 
such retailer's or wholesaler's business. 
2. The Commission's brief fails to cite a single case, from Utah or other 
jurisdiction, in support of its new interpretation. 
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3. The Commission brief admits that the Commission's new interpretation 
renders the isolated and occasional sale language in the statute mere surplusage 
(and hence negates the existence of any exemption). 
The Respondent makes the following admissions concerning the prior regulations of the 
Commission on page 13 of its Brief: 
An administrative regulation does lose its presumption of correctness simply 
because it is more restrictive than an earlier regulation of the same subject 
matter. Prior to the promulgation of Rule S-38, the State Tax Commission had 
applied the isolated and occasional sale exemption to any sale not made in the 
regular course of a retailer's or wholesaler's business. 
Brief of Respondent, page 13. The brief admits that the State Tax Commission "had 
applied" the exemption to sales not made in the regular course of retailer's business. 
Actually, such prior "application" by the Commission was by published regulations, 
initially promulgated in 1937 and sustained on two occasions by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Commission's brief cites no case from Utah or other jurisdictions in support of its 
current position. The passing reference in the Commission's brief to case authorities in 
other states is unconvincing. It states that all case and other authorities from other 
jurisdictions have no relevance to this proceeding, because all statutes are distinguishable 
from the Utah Statute. The unsupported statement ignores the numerous cases cited by the 
taxpayer in its brief. See Brief of Appellant Point HI and cases cited in footnote 3 on page 
12. The Commission fails to make even a passing reference to the Tennessee case, discussed 
at length by the taxpayer, which did involve a statute substantially identical in the pertinent 
part to the Utah statute. The Tennessee statute provided: 
The term "business" shall not be construed in this act to include occasional 
and isolated sales or transactions by a person who is not holding himself out 
as engaged in business. 
See Tennessee statute quoted in Liberty Cash Grocers, Inc. v. Z. D. Atkins, 304 S.W.2d 
633, 634, 202 Tenn. 448 (1957). (Emphasis added). It is also unreasonable to assume, as the 
Commission contends, that the Utah legislature intended that the Utah exemptions have a 
meaning in conflict with similar statutory exemptions found in a majority of state 
jurisdictions that indeed do have similar statutory language. 
Finally, the Commission brief admits that their new construction of the Utah statute 
renders the critical language in the statute mere surplusage. On page 5 of the brief, 
Respondent states as follows: 
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The statute simply says the same thing two different ways, ooviousiy ior 
emphasis or clarity. 
Brief of Respondent, page 5. Thus, under the interpretation of the State Tax Commission, 
the critical language, on which the exemption was based for thirty years in the 
administration of Utah tax laws, is now in the statute without any particular meaning but 
"obviously for emphasis". This position is anathema to the holding of this Court in L. A. 
Young Sons Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, 23 Utah 2d 84, 457 P.2d 978 
(1969). 
By attempting to render the isolated and occasional sales exemption mere surplusage, 
the Commission in its brief and current regulation develops quite a mixed bag in light of 
previous Utah Supreme Court decisions. The pertinent statutory language is very concise: 
[B]ut the term "retail sale" is not intended to include isolated or occasional 
sales by persons not regularly engaged in business . . . . 
U.C.A. §59-15-2(e). The plain meaning of this phrase is that the term "retail sale" is not 
intended to include isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged in the 
business of selling such property. The State Tax Commission, contemporaneously with the 
enactment of the exemption, believed this interpretation to be correct, and the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted this interpretation as early as 1949. The Commission now contends 
that the above quoted language means not regularly engaged in a business requiring a license 
((to collect sales tax". The statute, however, makes no reference to the distinction between 
license holders and non-license holders. But what does the Commission do with the holding 
of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Geneva Steel v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 
170, 209 P.2d 208 (1949), that the sale of the assets of a business is not made in the regular 
course of business of a person selling tangible personal property. The current regulation 
takes an inconsistent position by recognizing only one situation in which a license holder 
may make an isolated and occasional sale. The Commission's current regulation provides in 
substance that the exemption applies where a person sells his "entire business" to a "single 
buyer". Where does the statute talk about a "single buyer"? What happens to the taxpayer 
who sells a division of his business, rather than the "entire business", or a single store 
among a chain of stores? Why should the closing of an entire refinery installation be treated 
differently? Why should the sale of a used adding machine by a grocer (a license holder) be Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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me answer is mai me state lax commission ignores the substantial authorities that 
have interpreted exemptions for ''isolated or occasional" sales within the meaning of sales 
and use tax statutes. The scope of sales and use tax acts has generally been limited to sales 
made in the regular course of a business of a person selling tangible personal property. The 
exemption for isolated and occasional sales applies, as prior regulations of the Commission 
indicate, if the sale is "not made in the regular course of a business of a person selling 
tangible personal property", or in other words, if the sale is by a person not regularly 
engaged in the business of selling such property. The classic example of such sales is a sale 
by a retailer or wholesaler of its capital assets used by such person in the conduct of its 
business. As noted in our main brief on page 9, prior Utah regulations contained the factual 
"example" that the sale of fixtures by a merchant is not subject to tax, when the merchant 
sells them in the course of his modernization program. 
The action of the State Tax Commission to abrogate the exemption in Utah is 
arbitrary and capricious. Such action is not based on any amendment to the Utah statute. It 
is inconsistent with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. The action is further not 
supported by case authority interpreting similar statutory language from any jurisdiction. It 
is respectfully urged that the promulgation of regulation S-38 is beyond the power and 
authority of the State Tax Commission, because it is directly contrary to Utah statutory law. 
WHEREFORE, the taxpayer prays that the determination of the State Tax 
Commission that the taxpayer is liable for a use tax deficiency in the amount of $30,375.00, 
plus interest, be reversed, and for costs and such further relief as the Court deems 
appropriate. jj 
DATED this W * day of October, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
William A. Marshall 
Attorneys for Petitioner and 
Appellant, Husky Oil Company 
of Delaware 
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